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GRAND CANYON, WARSAW AND
THE HAGUE PROTOCOL
By G. NATHAN CALKINS

O NE of the

inevitable aftermaths of a great disaster such as the
Arizona collision between a TWA Super Constellation and a
United Airlines DC-7 over the Grand Canyon is the settlement of
wrongful death claims against the airlines involved in the tragedy.
At this writing it appears that the accident took place at approximately
21,000 feet over a barren wilderness, with no survivor left to tell the
story and no reliable eye-witness present to tell history what happened.
It may well be, as the investigation unfolds, that circumstantial evidence will reveal where the fault lay if there was in fact fault. However, looking at the disaster through the eyes of present knowledge,
it is not possible to say whether the accident occurred through the
fault of both operators, one of them, or neither.
Under the circumstances, it will be almost impossible for the
executor or next of kin of a person killed in the accident to establish
that the airline he sues was negligent and that its negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. The weather in which the aircraft
were flying at the time of the accident is not known. However, testimony of other pilots flying in the general area indicates that the floor
of the cloud tops was around 15,000 feet with scattered columns of
cumulus type clouds extending up to at least 22,000 feet. But this
testimony does not give the specific w"eather the aircraft were in at the
time. If instrument weather conditions actually prevailed, one set of
rules would apply; if both airplanes were operating free and clear of
clouds, another set would apply.
During the course of the accident hearing, a representative of the
Civil Aeronautics Administration testified that so far as that Administration was concerned, there was no known violation of the Air Traffic
Rules. In the past the courts have been liberal in applying the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur to collision cases. Smith v. O'Donnell (Cal.) 1932
U. S. Av. R. 145; Parker v. Granger (Cal.) 1935 U. S. Av. R. 83 (reversed Parker v. Granger (Cal.) 1936 U. S. Av. R. 251) Parcell v.
United States, S. D. W. Va. 1952 U. S. 8c C. Av. R. 391. However, in
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the Smith case the collision occurred while the colliding aircraft were
landing at an airport in good weather, and the aircraft operated by
the defendant and in which the plaintiff was riding was the higher
of the two. Unless the other aircraft had engaged in some extraordinary maneuver, it had the right of way as the lower landing craft.
Under such circumstances the application of the res ipsa doctrine
appears well warranted.
In both the Parkerand the Parcell cases the colliding aircraft were
both operated by the same operator, a fixed base operator in the former
case and the United States Air Force in the latter. Application of the
doctrine in the Parker case, however, was reversed upon a showing
that each airplane was equipped with fully functioning dual controls
and that in each case the right seat was occupied by a representative
of the movie studio which had hired the aircraft to take close-up air
shots of a third airplane. The court held that the movie representative
might have interfered with the controls of one or both ships during a
tight formation turn.
In the Parcell case two Air Force jet pilots took off in tight formation and entered the overcast, the collision occurring shortly thereafter.
It may be questioned whether flying a tight formation in an overcast is
not negligence per se, if damage results to third persons, but even if
not, since the United States was the employer of both pilots, it would
be liable whether one or both pilots had been negligent.
However, these cases can give little comfort to prospective plaintiffs
against the airlines involved in the Grand Canyon accident. All that
is known is that a collision probably occurred, but the circumstances
are completely unknown. As has been stated, if the collision occurred
in the overcast, one set of rules would apply. On the other hand, if
the two aircraft were being operated in the clear, well away from
clouds, negligence on the part of one or the other or both pilots would
be almost inevitable.
In addition to the foregoing difficulties facing the application of
the res ipsa rule, there are at least three variants of the doctrine itself
as applied by the courts of the different States.' Heaped on top of
as to whether
this is a complete confusion in the law of conflicts of law
2
the doctrine is a rule of evidence or one of substance.
Thus, the courts of New York and Massachusetts will apply the
law of the forum to determine the extent to which res ipsa should help
the plaintiff, the courts of the District of Columbia and Virginia will
apply the doctrine as applied by the courts of Arizona.
In addition to the wholesale confusion as to how and to what
extent the doctrine of res. ipsa will be applied, if at all, to accidents
' Harper on Torts Sec. 77 (1933).
2Rule is one of evidence-Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc. 1932 U. S.
Av. R. 139; Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc. 1931 U. S. Av. R. 229; Lobel
v. American Airlines, Inc. 1951 U. S. Av. R. 465. The rule is one of substanceSmith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines 1948 U. S. Av. R. 184; Lachman v.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. 160 F (2d) 496 (CCA 4, 1947).
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of this type, the question of limitations of liability is equally vexatious.
This accident happened in Arizona. In that State liability for wrongful death is unlimited. 8
However, if the accident had been postponed one half hour when
the aircraft were over Colorado, under the same conditions, the recovery for each death would be limited to $10,000, 4 and if it had not
occurred until the aircraft were over Kansas, the limit of liability
would jump to $25,000.1 Moreover, the track followed by these long
distance flights is not necessarily the same-under certain conditions
of wind and weather, the flights could have been routed far to the
north or to the south with attendant variations in applicable liability
rules.
The basic difficulty in cases of this nature is the rule that the law
of the situs fixes legal liability. Not that the rule itself is wrong, but
in its application of State law to aircraft accidents of this type it is too
microcosmic. Two airplanes traveling at speeds approaching four
hundred miles per hour, four miles above the surface of the earth, and
subject to exclusive federal control cannot in any realistic sense be
said to be within the jurisdiction of the underlying State. The occupants of the aircraft are completely cocooned and insulated from the
effective reach of the local law below; the State cannot enforce; it
cannot police; it cannot protect. We should stop trying to make it
do so with respect to the relations inter se of the passengers and the
carriers.
In the writer's opinion the only sensible solution to the legal morass
we now are in is a federal law establishing uniform rules for determining liability of air carriers to passengers and shippers. Such a law
should not attempt to impose any special or discriminatory burden on
aviation. It should not make the carrier an absolute insurer of the
passenger's safety. To do so would be an unwarranted departure from
our traditional notions of fair play, and common carrier responsibility.
However, such a law should recognize the facts of life of aviation
-that accidents such as the Grand Canyon collision do occur and that
the rules of res ipsa, even if uniformly imposed by federal law, do not
give an adequate solution. While it is certainly true that collisions do
not generally occur without someone's having been negligent, human
experience is powerless to pin point the negligence in collision cases
where it is not known whether the accident happened in the clouds
or in the clear.
The fairest solution appears to be a reversal of the burden of proof
accompanied by a reasonable limitation of liability. Reversal of the
burden of proof is fair in the same way that res ipsa is fair. If time
could be reversed and stopped at the first split second of impact, the
carrier through its servants could far better explain the accident and
3 Arizona Constitution Article II, See. 31.
4 Chap. 41, Art. 1, Sec. 1 Col. Rev. Stat. 1953.
5 General Statutes of Kansas 1949, 60-3202.

256
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how it occurred than could the passenger. Res ipsa would require such
an explanation to the then-living passenger. Death of all the participants should not deprive the plaintiff's executor of this advantage.
On the other hand some limitation of liability seems appropriate.
With the reversal of the burden of proof the defendant gains an incalculable advantage in cases such as the Grand Canyon accident. Frequently a non-negligent defendant will be held liable because of
complete absence of proof to exculpate himself. Obviously in such
situations it is unfair to saddle a defendant airline with unlimited as
well as unmerited liability.
Perhaps a better analysis is this: in a certain number of situations,
of which the Grand Canyon accident may be typical, the law becomes
stalled on dead center because of total absence of proof. Societyparticularly the air traveling part of it-owes a self-interested obligation
to see to it that in such circumstances the individual passenger does
not lose out. Under the rule that I have here outlined this obligation
would be discharged by the carrier, who insures such liability and
passes the premium on to the passenger or shipper by a slight additional charge for the ticket. Thus, each passenger assumes a pro rata
share of the obligation. Each passenger pays the same amount for the
same transportation, whether he be rich or poor, a man on death's
doorstep or in the prime of life. Each contributes equally to the
common fund, but one may receive much, another little.
Within limits such disparity is entirely fair. All other aspects of
transportation at standardized fares involve some discrimination between passengers. But there is no reason for one passenger to pay a
higher rate than he otherwise would in order to help buy insurance
to cover the exceptional case of the $200,000 or $300,000 claimant.
Consequently, it is submitted that the limitation of liability should be
fixed at what experience has shown to be the average recovery in other
cases in air transportation, leaving the person deserving more coverage
to take it out himself and to pay the premium thereon.
The foregoing discussion leads naturally into a discussion of the
Warsaw Convention 6 and of the protocol thereto which was adopted
at The Hague last year. At this time it is not known how manyif any-passengers on either airplane involved in the Grand Canyon
collision were traveling on an international journey within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. If there are any such cases, their
settlement should be quick and easy.
The Warsaw Convention itself came into force as a treaty on
February 13, 1933 after ratifications had been deposited by Spain,
Rumania and Brazil, France, Latvia and Poland. The United States,
which had not attended the Warsaw Conference and had not signed
the Convention, became a party to it by adherence. Its instrument of
adherence was deposited with the Government of Poland on July 3l,
6 49 Stat. 3000.
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1934, and accordingly it came into force with respect to this country
on October 29, 1934. As of September 10, 1955, 45 countries had
either ratified or adhered to the Convention.
Thus, the Warsaw Convention for a substantial part of a generation has governed the liability of air carriers to shippers and passengers
in a major and ever increasing part of the world's international commerce by air. On the whole it has been a beneficial Convention. It
has laid down uniform documentation rules. It established a system
of liability based on negligence coupled with a transfer of the burden
of proof to the carrier to prove that he has taken all necessary measures
to avoid the damage-or that it was impossible for the carrier and his
servants and agents to take such measures. Most important, it established a limitation of liability in the case of passenger injury or death,
occurring during the period of international carriage, at 125,000
gold francs-which at current rates of exchange amounts to slightly
less than eighty-three hundred dollars.
The Convention was by no means perfect. Dissatisfaction with
some of its provisions began to be voiced shortly after it came into
force. This dissatisfaction arose primarily from certain ambiguities
contained in the original text. As a result, the matter of revision was
undertaken by the Citeja in 1935. However, international drafting
was no speedier then than now, and the faltering steps to restudy the
Convention were completely halted by the war.
After the close of World War II, the restudy of the Warsaw Convention was taken up again by the Citeja and subsequently by its
successor, the Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation
Organization. The Convention's revision was discussed by the Citeja
at its meeting in Cairo in November of 1946; thereafter the Legal
Committee of ICAO devoted time to it in 1948 at its Lisbon meeting
and took the matter up again in Montreal in June of 1949. It was not
discussed again until January, 1952, when a special subcommittee of
the ICAO Legal Committee met in Paris to consider the question,
and prepared a draft text of a new Convention to replace the existing
one.
By this time the revision was in full swing. The final preparatory
work was accomplished at Rio in September of 1953. At this point,
however, it was decided to abandon the more ambitious project of
drawing up a complete new Convention and to confine the revision
to a few necessary amendments which could be set forth in the form
of a protocol.
The draft protocol which came out of Rio bore a strictly procarrier flavor. While the limits of liability were raised from one
hundred and twenty-five thousand to two hundred thousand gold
francs (approximately $13,330) for personal injury or death, this
raise fell far short of the twenty-five thousand dollars which the United
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States sought to obtain. Moreover, certain of the detailed documentation requirements which in the older Convention inured to the benefit
of the shipper and passenger were eliminated, and Article 25-which
sets forth the circumstances under which the limitation of liability
will not apply-was severely curtailed in such a way as to make it
virtually impossible to exceed the liability limits. Under the Rio
draft it was necessary practically to show criminal intent for the liability limitations not to apply.
In addition, under the Rio proposal a new Article 25A was included
providing that in instances where defenses and limits were available
to the carrier, they would also be available to a servant or agent of the
carrier in any tort suit brought against him under applicable internal
law. This provision was inserted in order to prevent a "short-circuiting" of the limitations of liability through a suit against the pilot or
his estate, coupled with the usual agreements by the carrier with his
personnel to hold them harmless for any personal liability which
might be incurred by them.
When the Rio-draft protocol came to be considered by The Hague
Conference, the major issues of substance included the following
points: Simplification of documentation requirements; notice to passengers and shippers of the Convention's possible applicability and
effect; raising of the limits of liability; treatment of attorney's fees and
other litigation expenses; principles of liability; "willful misconduct";
and limitation of independent liability of servants or agents. These,
together with matters of more subordinate interest are discussed more
fully below.
(a)

Simplification of Documentation

The present Warsaw Convention has a complete chapter devoted
to traffic documents, dealing with their form and content and placing
responsibility for furnishing particulars on the carrier in the case of
passenger tickets and baggage checks, and on the carrier and consignor
separately in the case of the air waybill. With respect to the content
of the traffic documents, the present Convention deals with three broad
categories of particulars. In the first category come those essential
parts of the transportation contract which establish whether the transportation falls within the terms of the Convention. Thus the place of
departure and destination of the journey contracted for must be set
forth since only after these are known is it possible to determine
whether the Convention applies. Moreover, since such determination
may in some cases depend on the existence of an intermediate "agreed
stopping place," the present Convention requires that such particulars
be inserted.
Only one item comes within the second category of particulars
required by the present Convention. That particular is a specific
statement that the.,carriage "is subject to the rules of liability estab-

THE HAGUE PROTOCOL

lished by the Convention." It is understood that the draftsmen of the
original Convention had two reasons for inserting this requirement:
(a) a notification to the transportation user that the carriers' potential
liability was governed by a special set of rules; (b) an undertaking
between the parties to include the liability provisions of the Convention in their contract of carriage, to the end that if suit on the contract
were brought in a non-contracting state, the courts of that country
could enforce the Convention requirements, even though its government were not a party to the Convention.
The third category of particulars are those not covered by the first
two categories but which good commercial practice would normally
require to be inserted in traffic documents. Such particulars spell out
the terms of the agreement. Some, like the place and date of issue,
have a bearing on the enforcement of rights under the Convention as
well as an independent commercial significance. Others may affect the
consignee of cargo as well as the shipper and carrier. It is understood
that the reason for inclusion of this requirement was that legislation
of this nature was considered desirable and that there should be intergovernmental agreement on precisely what was required in order to
achieve uniformity. However, the only sanction Which the Convention
provided for failure to insert any of the required particulars was
unlimited liability of the carrier. While this sanction did not apply
in all cases, it did so in a large number of them and the result could
be frequently far out of proportion to the gravity of the fault on the
part of the carrier. For this reason there was a strong desire on the
part of many governments to eliminate the last category of particulars
from any mandatory requirement in the Convention.
The United States position was to support a certain amount of simplification, but to oppose the complete deletion of the requirements
relating to the third category of particulars. The delegation urged
that if documentation requirements were eliminated, a regulatory
void would be left which governments would think essential to fill,
and that, in so doing, conflicting requirements would undoubtedly be
imposed. While a motion to eliminate all documentation requirements was defeated, the argument was not sufficiently strong to keep
the large majority of representatives from eliminating all required
particulars falling into the third category. Consequently the protocol
revises the Convention so far as required documentation is concerned
by retaining only the "jurisdictional" requirements and the requirement of notice of the Convention's applicability.
With respect to the jurisdictional particulars, it will still be necessary to include the places of departure and destination in the passenger
ticket, the baggage check (when it is a separate document), and in
the air waybill. So far as agreed stopping places are concerned, these
need be mentioned only when the applicability of the Convention
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turns upon there being an agreed stopping place. Thus the inclusion
of an agreed stopping place in the traffic documents is required only
if the places of departure and of destination are within the territory
of the same contracting state, and there are one or more agreed stopping places in another state. It should be noted that in case of a plurality of agreed stopping places, only one of them must be mentioned.
The net effect of the changes made in the documentation provisions is to permit a considerable simplification of tickets, baggage
checks, and particularly air waybills. Carriers will have the power to
develop more flexible practices with regard to traffic documentation
as the needs for commerce may dictate. Undoubtedly, self-interest on
the part of the carriers will prompt them to continue in practice to
include most of the particulars which are currently required by the
Convention.
(b)

Notice to Passengers and Shippers of the
Convention's Application

A matter closely related to the simplification of the documentation
discussed in (a) above is the matter of notice of the application of the
Convention to the passenger or shipper. The present Convention
contains a mandatory requirement that there be included in each
traffic document a statement that "the transportation is subject to the
rules relating to liability established by this Convention." The language of the requirement, supported by the legislative history at the
Warsaw Conference, indicates that it probably was the intention of the
draftsmen to require an unequivocal statement that the particular
transportation concerned was covered by the Convention.
The reasons for the foregoing requirement are believed to have
been two fold-primarily to bring about an undertaking between the
carrier and the passenger or shipper that the rules relating to liability
of the Convention would apply as a matter of contract between them.
In the early days, prior to the time that the Convention achieved its
present widespread acceptance, this provision may have had a certain
utility, since it provided a mechanism, based on well accepted prin*ciples of conflicts of laws, for enforcing the Convention in noncontracting states, and from a theoretical legal point of view at least
this was an important consideration.
The second reason for requiring this statement was to put the
user upon notice that his liability relations with the carrier were subject to special rules of which he might otherwise not be aware. This
point was of lesser importance then than it is today, since in a large
number of countries at the time the Warsaw Convention was signed
it was possible for the carrier to exculpate itself entirely from liability.
However, the notification provisions did place the passenger or shipper
on notice that a special law applied to his relationship with the carrier.
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With most of the air transport countries of the world today pirties
to the Convention, the need for securing its enforcement in noncontracting states has diminished. At the same time, since there has
undoubtedly been an increase in national legislation outlawing exculpation by common carriers for their own negligence, the notification
provision has become increasingly important in order to bring home
to passengers the fact that restrictions will apply.
For a number of years the United States, in the debates on the
subject in the Legal Committee of ICAO, had supported a specific
notification provision. However, notice is subject to the difficulty that
in many instances it will be next to impossible even for a trained
lawyer to determine whether the carriage contracted for is subject to
the Convention, and the continued insistence on a specific notice
requirement would have imposed serious burdens in some cases upon
air carriers. A mistake by a ticket agent in determining whether or
not the carriage is to be under the terms of the Convention would have
entirely altered the liability situation for the specific case, and while
the difficulties were not insuperable and probably could have been
covered by insurance, a real problem existed.
Because the benefit accorded by the statement presently in the
Warsaw Convention was so small to the passenger or shipper, the
United States urged a somewhat different policy at the Conference.
This was to require the printing of a general notice on all travel
documents coming under the Warsaw Convention. Because of the
generality of its terms, the notice could also be printed on travel
documents which did not apply to Warsaw carriage, including domestic
transportation.
The purpose of the revised notice was to give the passenger or
shipper information which would permit him to protect himself by
taking out insurance. It read as follows:
"ADVICE TO INTERNATIONAL TRAVELLERS
(in letters not less than one-half centimeter high)
"Travellers embarking upon a journey involving an ultimate
destination or stop in a country other than the country of origin
are advised that the Warsaw Convention may be applicable to their
journey. The Convention governs the liability of carriers to
passengers and shippers and limits liability for personal injury or
death in most cases to
Poincar6 gold francs. (Here
insert the amount prescribed by the Convention.)"
In the debate on this subject, three different proposals were given
the most serious consideration by the Conference. The first of these
was that contained in the Rio text, which provided for a specific notification. The second was a joint United Kingdom-Israeli proposal
which, although general in form, was phrased in precise legal language,
and the third proposal was that of the United States, in which the
International Air Transport Association joined.
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After considerable debate, the United States proposal was adopted
in a modified form by twenty votes to ten. However, the Conference
decided not to include requirements either as to the size of the type
or a statement of the monetary extent of the limitation.
The substance of the U. S. notification provision as discussed above
with respect to personal injury and death was also accepted by the
Conference, with necessary modifications, in Article IV with respect
to baggage, and in Article VI with respect to cargo. These provisions
are all substantially the same, with slightly different wording to fit
the different situations.
(c)

Limitations of Liability

By far the most important issue considered by the Conference,
and the one on which most debate was had, was the matter of limitation of liability for passenger death or personal injury. Throughout
the development of the Protocol the United States had taken the
position that the limits should be very substantially raised. This took
the form of urging that the limits should be tripled so as to permit
recovery for any one passenger death or injury up to 375,000 Poincar
gold francs, or approximately $25,000. This position was renewed at
the Conference.
During the discussion of the Draft Protocol at the Rio meeting of
the Legal Committee of ICAO, the United States Delegation there
had obtained agreement to the raising of the limits only to 200,000
gold francs, or 60% above the present limits. Additionally, and notwithstanding that rather meager increase from the passenger's viewpoint, the Rio group had adopted a counter-balancing amendment to
Article 25 of the Convention, which severely restricted the instances
where the limits would not apply.
It became apparent at the outset of the Conference that the majority of the delegates present were prepared to accept the Rio provisions
without substantial amendment in either regard. Since the matter of
raising the limits was coupled in the minds of most delegates with the
matter of restricting the provisions of Article 25, the debate was conducted within this framework.
With regard to both these provisions, the United States position
was undoubtedly at the liberal extreme from the point of view of the
passenger. Not only did the United States Delegation urge that the
limits be raised to $25,000, but it strongly argued that the present
provisions of Article 25 should not be amended.
After a full day and a half of discussion as to the limits and with
respect to Article 25, the Conference took a trial vote on several
combinations of limits and redrafts of Article 25. This vote showed
that, even with the restrictive Rio text of Article 25, the 375,000 franc
limit requested by the United States would be acceptable to only three
delegations, and that 250,000 francs would have been acceptable only
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to seven. Seventeen delegations, however, would have supported the
Rio limits with the Rio text of Article 25. With the Warsaw text of
Article 25 only two votes would have been received for 375,000 francs,
two for 300,000 and two for 250,000. The trial vote showed twentythree delegations for the Warsaw text of Article 25 with a 200,000
franc limit, but this was influenced largely by the fact that the United
States had voted in favor of this combination to mark its preference
of the Warsaw text of Article 25 over the other two texts of that article.
Consequently the vote in this last case must be considered as misleading and not indicative of the true sentiment of the Conference.
Before the matter came up for final vote, the United States had
introduced a proposal to raise the limits to 250,000 francs ($16,584),
coupled with a provision raising the limits an additional 2500 to cover

reasonable attorneys' fees in the event that the defendant carrier forces
the plaintiff to litigate. In presenting the United States proposal for
the 250,000 franc limit, together with the 25% increase for attorneys'
fees, the United States Delegation stated that it would accept this
either with the so-called Norwegian proposal for the revised Article 25
of the Convention or with the Warsaw text as it was in the original
Convention. It stated it would not accept it linked to Article 25 of
the Rio draft.
After a three-day postponement of discussion and vote on this article, the basic United States proposal was adopted by a majority of
twenty-four votes to fourteen, with three abstensions. Of the fourteen
voting against the proposal, eight signed the final Protocol.
(d)

Attorneys' Fees and Other Litigation Expenses

As noted above, one of the points urged by the United States was
that the court should be permitted to increase the limits by an amount
not exceeding 250 to cover court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees
to the plaintiff, to be paid by the carrier in addition to the amount
of the recovery. This proposal was subject to the qualification that
the limits would not be subject to this escalator action if the defendant
carrier could show that prior to the commencement of the trial it
offered to settle the case for the same or a greater sum than the recovery
actually awarded.
When this proposal was presented to the Conference, coupled with
the 250,000 franc limit, there were a number of reactions. First, several delegates indicated that their countries had administered the
provisions of the present Article 22 (limits of liability) as not precluding the award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiff, and that they did
not consider such costs as coming under the limits at all. Secondly, a
number of states disliked the specification of attorneys' fees and desired
that the provision be framed in more general terms, such as "legal
expenses." It was pointed out that in certain countries attorneys' fees
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covered only trial attorneys' fees and did not include legal costs for the
preparation of the trial and other legal expenses. Thirdly, a formalistic
objection was made to the raising of the limits by 25% instead of
merely providing that the presence of the limitation of liability would
not bar the court from awarding attorneys' fees and other legal costs,
which when added to the recovery under the Convention would exceed
the limits.
After considerable debate and a number of drafting modifications,
the Conference finally agreed to accept the provision as set forth in
the amendment to Article 22, subparagraph 4, which reads as follows:
"4. The limits prescribed in this article shall not prevent the'
court from awarding, in accordance with its own law, in addition,
the whole or part of the court costs and of the other expenses of
the litigation incurred by the plaintiff. The foregoing provision
shall not apply if the amount of the damages awarded, excluding
court costs and other expenses of the litigation, does not exceed
the sum which the carrier has offered in writing to the plaintiff
within a period of six months of the date of the occurrence causing
the damage, or before the commencement of the action, if that is
later."
It should be noted that the language finally adopted preserves the
United States proposal in its substantive aspects, but differs from it in
that there is no limitation on the amount of the attorneys' fees; attorneys' fees as such are not specified (although it is definitely clear that
they are included); nor is there any requirement that the fees be
reasonable.
With respect to the 25% limitation, it was pointed out by a number of delegations that if the recovery were very low, a limitation of
25% would by no means reimburse the plaintiff and it would be
wholly unjust to limit attorneys' fees to 25% in such cases. For that
reason the majority decided to eliminate the 25%. With respect to the
word "reasonable," objection was made on behalf of a number of the
French and Spanish speaking delegates that "reasonable" could not
be translated into their tongues with the meaning in which it was
used in English, and that in addition, any court costs or attorneys' fees
which had been allowed or approved by the court would ipso facto
have to be considered reasonable. For this reason the Conference
decided to eliminate the word "reasonable."
It should be pointed out that the provision concerning legal expenses is not limited to passenger injuries or death actions. It also
applies in the case of baggage claims and other actions brought under
the Convention.
On the whole, it is believed that the inclusion of this provision
goes a long way toward increasing the value of the limits actually
obtained.
Supplemental legislation may be necessary in order to put this provision uniformly in effect in United States courts, although each state
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can, of course, provide that in Warsaw cases their courts may award
attorneys' fees to be payable by the defendant in any amount which
may be customary in that jurisdiction.
(e)

"Wilful Misconduct"

Reference has been made under (c) and (d) above to the provisions of Article 25 of the Convention, which provide for the nonapplication of the limits of liability in certain cases. As presently
written, the Warsaw Convention provides that the carrier shall not be
entitled to avail himself. of the provisions of the Convention which
exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilful
misconduct or by such default on his part, as in accordance with the
law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be
equivalent to wilful misconduct. The words "wilful misconduct" are
a translation in both the English and American texts of the French
word "dol." Legal writers and jurists have long asserted that this
translation is not the equivalent of the French word "dol," and indeed
it is doubtful whether there is any uniform understanding in Latin
language countries as to what the French word "dol" means.
As a result of the confusion engendered by this provision, many
states have sought its revision for a number of years. In certain countries the desired means of clarification was practically to foreclose any
"breakthrough" of the limits of liability except in the most unusual
and outrageous circumstances. Such a means of achieving clarification
would obviously operate in favor of the carrier at the expense of the
passenger or shipper. However, as mentioned earlier, this approach
had the support of the majority at the Rio meeting of the Legal Committee of ICAO. Thus the provision in the Rio Draft of the Protocol,
which was before the Conference, provided as follows:
"The limits of liability specified in Article 22 of the Convention

shall not apply if it is proved the damage resulted from a deliberate
act or omission of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with
intent to cause damage; provided that, in the case of a deliberate
act or omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved that he was
acting in the course of his employment."
The United States Delegation strongly opposed the Rio provision
and urged that the Conference leave unamended the present Article
25 of the Warsaw Convention. However, it was apparent that the
Conference was unwilling to leave this article in its present state, and

accordingly the delegation supported a proposal made by the Delegation of Norway which, in the writer's opinion, was the closest to the
present Article 25 in substance.
The Norwegian proposal read as follows:
"The limits of liability specified in Article 22 of the Convention
shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act
or omission of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent
to cause damage or recklessly not caring whether or not damage
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was likely to result; provided that, in the case of such act or omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved that he was acting in
the course of his employment, and within the scope of his
authority."
After considerable debate, the proposal was adopted by the Conference, but was modified to read as follows:
"The limits of liability specified in Article 22 shall not apply
if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission
of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to cause
damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result; provided that, in the case of such act or omission of
a servant or agent, it is also proved that he was acting within the
scope of his employment."
In connection with the Norwegian proposal as finally adopted by
the Conference, it is interesting to note the charge to the jury in the
Jane Froman case in the Supreme Court. of New York, which included
the following:
"'Wilful' ordinarily means intentional; the act that was done
was what the person doing it meant to do. But the phrase 'wilful
misconduct' means something more than that. It means that in
addition to doing the act in question, the actor must have intended
the result that came about or must have launched on such a line
of conduct with knowledge of what the consequences probably
would be, and had gone ahead recklessly despite his knowledge of
these conditions..."
It should be noted that the revised Article 25 does not require that
the intent to cause damage be to cause the specific damage which
results, nor in the case of reckless conduct, knowledge that the specific
damage would come about. It suffices that any kind of damage be
intended or foreseen as probable. Thus the doctrine of "transferred
intent" is incorporated.
During the course of the debate some attempt was made to eliminate the word "recklessly," because of certain difficulties in its translation into French. The United States Delegation opposed this, since the
elimination of this word could entirely change the scope of the article.
For example, a pilot, making a forced or emergency landing, knows
that some damage to the airplane or to the ground is probable, but
his act may be in no wise reckless. Other instances will come to
mind where some damage will probably result from a given act but
where the act is either entirely justified or at the worst, simple negligence. If "recklessly" were not in the article, under the doctrine of
transferred intent, unlimited liability would flow for an act of simple
negligence, if damage of any kind were foreseeably probable, even
-though the damage that actually resulted was not foreseeable.
There is one interesting additional sidelight on the revision of
Article 25. While the revised article is believed to be substantially a
paraphrase of the present Article 25 as it is administered by United
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States courts, there appears to be no doubt that it considerably tightens
the article as it is now currently administered in certain foreign courts.
Some foreign countries presently regard gross negligence as sufficient
to bring this article into play. As a result of the Conference's action,
the Spanish and French texts of the provision have been considerably
restricted. This would bring about the result of maintaining substantially the same rule of law as is presently applied in courts
within the United States, at the same time giving United States carriers
the benefit of the treatment accorded them in our courts in suits in
foreign countries.
(f)

Conclusion as to Article 22 and Article 25

There is no doubt that these two articles represent the most important area dealt with by the Conference. In arriving at the result, the
United States Delegation played a leading role, and the agreement
obtained represents in the writer's opinion the maximum that is
possible of achievement now or at any time in the reasonably foreseeable future. It is quite apparent that very few countries are willing
to raise the limits of liability to the top amount desired by the United
States. However, through the device of the attorneys' fees provision,
the basic result sought by the United States is achieved in situations
where the carrier forces the plaintiff to sue and to expend money on
litigation. Its effect inevitably will be to cause the carrier to make
offers of settlement at or close to the limits of liability in cases where
it cannot clearly show that the damage was substantially less than
those limits.
(g)

Liability of Employees

As a result of the consideration of employee liability in connection
with the development of the Rome Convention (Rome Convention,
Article 9), the Legal Committee at Rio de Janeiro gave considerable
thought to this question in the development of a Protocol to the
Warsaw Convention. In the existing Convention, no attempt was
made specifically to cover the liability of servants or agents of the
carrier for their individual tortious acts.7 In essence, the problems
presented in this connection are twofold:
7 Cf. Wanderer v. Sabena, 1949 U. S. Av. R. 25 and Chutter v. KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines, 132 F. Supp. 611. These two cases, which respectively hold that
an agent of the carrier and an independent contractor to the carrier are entitled
to all the benefits of the Conventions, are believed clearly wrong. The report of
Henry De Vos, submitting the Citeja draft text of the Convention to the Warsaw
Conference, includes the following material (translation from the French) :
"Before examining the articles of the draft, it is necessary to bring out the
fact that in this field, international agreement cannot be obtained unless it is
limited to certain determined problems. Therefore the text only applies to the
contract of carriage-first with respect to its external forms, and second in the
legal relationships which are established between the carrier and the persons
carried or the shipper. It does not govern any other questions which the exploitation of the carriage may bring out." Minutes of the Warsaw Conference, p. 160.
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(a) Because of the limitations of liability available to the carrier
in most cases, pressures will be built up to sue the individual employee
under usual principles of negligence law, with the hope that if negligence can be proved, a substantial recovery may be had against the
pilot or other negligent servant. Thus the presence of a limitation of
liability may tend to encourage suits against the servant in cases where
customarily the operator alone would be called upon to defend.
(b) Secondly, in order to protect themselves against such potential
liability pilots, and other employees, through their bargaining agents,
will be astute to see to it that their contracts of employment contain
clauses to hold them harmless, in the event they are so sued. This has
the effect of circumventing the limitation of liability provided in the
Convention.
For these two reasons it was deemed desirable to provide that the
defenses contained in the Convention as to limits should be made
available to the servant or agent as well.
It will be noted that the principle of Article 25 (a) is only to make
available to the servant the limits of liability which are also available
to the carrier. No cause of action whatsoever is provided in the Convention for suit against the servant or agent. Secondly, it should be
noted that in paragraph 3 of Article 25 (a) the provisions do not
apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission
of the servant or agent, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly
and with knowledge that damage would probably result. Thus, the
servant is subjected to the same rules with respect to loss of limitations
of liability for reckless acts as is the carrier.
A further point should also be noted. The Conference was fully
aware that this question was subordinate to the main purpoess of the
Convention, and expressly refrained from making a "Convention
within a Convention" applicable to the liability of servants and agents
of international carriers. Thus, if for any reason the limits of liability
are not available to the carrier-as for example in the case where no
ticket has been issued or the ntoice requirement has been omittedthe provisions of Article 25 (a) may not be availed of by the servant
or agent. Also, presumably, if there has been a concurrent act of
negligence on the part of the defendant servant which allows a wilful
or reckless act of a fellow servant to produce damage, both servants
acting within the scope of their employment, the negligent servant
would be liable without limits, since the carrier would not be in a
position to assert the limits of liability in such a case.
(h)

Other Substantive Changes

In the Draft Protocol drawn up by the Legal Committee at Rio
de Janeiro there was a provision excluding from the operation of the
Convention the carriage of persons, cargo and baggage for military
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authorities by aircraft, the whole capacity of which had been reserved
by such authorities. The Conference did not include a similar provision in the Final Protocol, but instead permitted (Article 26) a reservation to be made by a state at any time, by notification addressed to
the depositary, that the Convention as amended by the Protocol should
not apply to such carriage on aircraft registered in that state. Carriage
on aircraft registered in one state and chartered by the military authorities of another would come under the provisions of the Convention
notwithstanding the reservation.
In Article IX of the Protocol an amendment is made to Article 15
of the Convention, which provides that nothing in the Convention
prevents the issuance of a negotiable air waybill.
This provision is referred to in a recommendation of the Conference set forth as A of the Final Act, which contains a declaration by
the Conference that Article IX of the Protocol to Amend the Warsaw
Convention was inserted therein only for the purpose of clarification.
This is in substantial accord with the recommendations of the Negotiability Subcommittee of the ICAO Legal Committee, which met in
Madrid in April of 1955.
The Conference deleted paragraph 2 of the present Article 20 of
the Convention which, in cases involving baggage or cargo, currently
gives a defense to the carrier where the damage is occasioned by an
error in piloting or navigation, etc. Consequently, the deletion means
that the rule as to cargo and baggage will no longer contain this exceptional exclusion from liability.
The English text of Article 22 has been modified somewhat, as
it relates to special declarations, to correspond with the true intent
of the same provision in the original Convention, and now there may
be a special declaration of interest in delivery at destination by the
consignor, which may exceed the value of the goods itself.
Over the objection of the United States Delegation, Section 22(2) (b) was amended to provide for applying, in the case of partial
loss of shipment, a limitation proportionate to the weight of the package actually lost or damaged, and not of the entire shipment, unless
the object lost affects the value of the other packages covered by the
same shipment.
Article 23 of the Convention, paragraph 1, was revised so as to
permit contractual exclusions from liability for "loss or damage resulting from the inherent defect, quality or vice of the cargo carried."
The Conference failed to adopt a proposal by the United States Delegation that this clause be limited to damage resulting solely from such
inherent defect, etc. However, the legislative history is clear that
omission of the word "solely" was based on the fact that its inclusion
was unnecessary rather than intending a different rule of law.
A new article (Article 40 (a)) was inserted in the ConVention,
which modifies the definition of "High Contracting Party." This
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modification is intended to deal with a specific situation on the applicability of the Convention as between members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is not believed to affect or otherwise interest the
United States.
In Article 26 of the Convention, in accordance with the proposal
of the United States, the time for giving notice of damage was extended
to seven days from the date of the receipt in the case of baggage, and
14 days from the date of the receipt in case of cargo. In the case of
delay this period was made 21 days.
(i)

Procedural Matters and Final Provisions

One of the matters which the Conference had before it was set
forth in a report of a Subcommittee on the Warsaw Protocol, which
met at Madrid concurrently with the Subcommittee on Negotiability
of the Air Waybill. This Subcommittee Report was made available
to the Conference, and concluded that the obligations contained
in the Convention, as amended by the Protocol, could be inconsistent
with the obligation under the Convention not so amended, in the
event that a liability relationship should arise as between carriers of
a state which has ratified the Protocol and'other citizens of a state
or states, which though parties to the Convention, had not ratified
the Protocol. The fear was expressed in the report that the courts
of a state presented with such a question would not be able to follow
the Convention's provisions as amended by the Protocol in favor of
the carrier, for example, without infringing the rights of the passenger
or shipper who were citizens of the non-Protocol state.
This matter was debated at some length and views were expressed
that the obligations under the two documents would be consistent, as
well as views supporting the Report of the Subcommittee. Certain
states felt strongly that they would be unable to remain a party to the
existing Convention if they became a party to the Convention as
amended by the Protocol; whereas other states were equally strong in
their views that they would desire to have both documents remain in
effect with respect to the operations severally affected thereby
The solution which the Conference adopted was a somewhat novel
one and consists basically of permitting each Contracting State, at the
time it ratifies the Protocol, to decide for itself whether the obligations under the Convention as amended by the Protocol will conflict
to such an extent with those contained in the simple Convention that
it must denounce the latter. States believing such to be the case may
denounce the Convention, but in such event the parties to the Protocol will not construe such denunciation in any way as a denunciation
of the Convention as amended by the Protocol (Article XXIV). This
provision read together with Article XIX of the Protocol, which provides that, as between the parties to the Protocol, the Convention and
the Protocol shall be read and interpreted together as one single
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instrument makes certain that, as between the parties to the Protocol,
any state may denounce the Convention with respect to states which
have not ratified the Protocol, but still remain bound to it with
respect to those states which have ratified the Protocol.
In view of the fact that the Government of Poland was the depositary under the original Warsaw Convention, the majority of the Conference believed that fewer legal questions would arise with continuing
that government as depositary than by establishing the International
Civil Aviation Organization as depositary of the Protocol. In this
connection it should be noted that several of the parties to the original
Warsaw Convention are not members of ICAO, and for that reason
might have difficulty in ratifying the Protocol, were ICAO to be made
the depositary. Although the United States Delegation supported the
naming of ICAO as depositary, we joined in a motion to make the
designation of the Peoples Republic of Poland unanimous, after a
preferential vote indicated the desire of the majority of the delegates.
The Protocol is to come into effect as soon as thirty signatory
states have deposited their instruments of ratification.
Article XXVI prohibits any reservation other than that heretofore
referred to with respect to military charter flights.
It will be noted that the system adopted by the Protocol is somewhat unusual. The Protocol is divided into three chapters, of which
Chapter I contains specific amendments to the Convention in the
form of amending language. Chapter II, consisting of one single
article (Article XVIII), provides for the application of the Convention as amended by the Protocol, confining the Convention as amended
to international carriage which has its place of departure and destination either in the territories of two parties to the Protocol or within
the territory of a single party to the Protocol with an agreed stopping
place within the territory of another state. Chapter III contains the
final clauses.
Conclusion
The Grand Canyon accident serves to underscore the need to put
our legal house in order in the domestic air transport liability field.
The rules presently applicable to airline passenger injury and death
claims promote injustice, foster unnecessary litigation and increase
costs of making reparation when accidents arise. The Warsaw Convention, as amended by The Hague Protocol, is a good approach to
this problem, and while the limits of liability set forth therein may
be too low for domestic use, in its basic approach is believed best for
the traveling public and for air transportation.

